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RISK ATTITUDES AND DECISION WEIGHTS' 
BY AMOS TVERSKY AND PETER WAKKER 
To accommodate the observed pattern of risk-aversion and risk-seeking, as well as 
common violations of expected utility (e.g., the certainty effect), we introduce and 
characterize a weighting function according to which an event has greater impact when it 
turns impossibility into possibility, or possibility into certainty, than when it merely makes 
a possibility more or less likely. We show how to compare such weighting functions (of 
different individuals) with respect to the degree of departure from expected utility, and we 
present a method for comparing an individual's weighting functions for risk and for 
uncertainty. 
KEYWORDS: Risk attitude, decision weights, rank dependence, source dependence. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF DECISION under risk and uncertainty combines the 
principle of mathematical expectation with the assumption of decreasing 
marginal utility, which jointly imply risk aversion. Three clusters of phenomena 
reflecting risk attitudes have challenged the descriptive validity of the classical 
theory. First, although risk aversion is prevalent, there are situations in which 
risk seeking is commonly observed. Gambling is a case in point. Second, there is 
a considerable body of evidence that preferences between risky prospects are 
not linear in the probabilities. The certainty effect, demonstrated by Allais, is 
the best-known example of this phenomenon. Third, people's preferences de- 
pend not only on the degree of uncertainty but also on the source of uncer- 
tainty. For instance, people sometimes prefer to bet on known rather than 
unknown probabilities, as demonstrated by Ellsberg. 
There have been many attempts to explain risk attitudes that are inconsistent 
with expected utility. Much recent work has been devoted to theories that 
extend expected utility by introducing nonadditive decision weights (Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979), Quiggin (1982), Yaari (1987), Gilboa (1987), Schmeidler 
(1989), Luce and Fishburn (1991)). In these models, preferences are determined 
jointly by the utility function that measures the subjective value of the outcomes, 
and by the decision weights that capture what may be called chance attitude. 
In this article we present a theoretical analysis of decision weights that is 
motivated by the observed pattern of risk seeking, nonlinear preferences, and 
source dependence. This pattern suggests an S-shaped weighting function that 
overweights small probabilities and underweights moderate and high probabili- 
ties (Section 2). The theoretical framework used in this paper is introduced in 
Section 3. Section 4 establishes the properties of the preference order that are 
necessary and sufficient for an S-shaped weighting function. This analysis is 
1 This research was supported by Grant SES-9109535 from the National Science Foundation. 
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extended to uncertainty in Section 5. In analogy to the Pratt/Arrow analysis of 
comparative risk aversion, Section 6 introduces the relation more-SA-than 
between the weighting functions of different individuals, which reflects depar- 
ture from expected utility. Section 7 introduces a method for comparing the 
weighting function of the same individual for different sources of uncertainty. 
This method is used to analyze the observed relation between risk and uncer- 
tainty. Proofs are deferred to the Appendix. 
2. THE FOURFOLD PA7TFERN 
In order to motivate the present development, we first illustrate some com- 
mon features of people's attitude toward risk. Consider simple prospects of the 
form (x, p) that offer $x with probability p, and nothing otherwise. The study of 
choice between simple risky prospects has given rise to the fourfold pattern 
illustrated in Table I. These data are taken from a study by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992) in which each subject made a series of choices between a risky 
prospect and various cash offers. The value of C(x, p) is the median cash offer 
(in dollars) that was indifferent to the prospect (x, p). 
Table I exhibits risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses of low 
probability combined with risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses of 
high probability. This pattern has been observed in numerous studies, with and 
without contingent payoffs (Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979), Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), Hershey and Schoemaker (1980), Payne, Laughhunn, and Crum 
(1981), Cohen, Jaffray, and Said (1987), Wehrung (1989), Tversky and Kahne- 
man (1992)). Extreme risk seeking for long shots has recently been reported by 
Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) in an experiment conducted in China with real 
payoffs that were considerably higher than the subjects' normal monthly income. 
Risk seeking for small probabilities of gains is consistent with common observa- 
tions of gambling and risky ventures, whereas risk seeking for high-probability 
losses is consistent with the tendency to accept a risk in order to avoid a sure 
loss. 
Friedman and Savage (1948) and Markowitz (1952) have attempted to explain 
the combination of risk seeking and risk aversion in terms of a utility function 
with both concave and convex regions. However, because the fourfold pattern 
arises over a wide range of payoffs, it cannot be explained by the utility function 
for money. Instead, it suggests a nonlinear transformation of the probability 
scale. 
TABLE I 
THE FOURFOLD PATrERN OF RISK ATriTUDES 
Gain Loss 
Low probability C(100,.05) =14 C(-100,.05)- -8 
Low probability (Risk Seeking) (Risk Aversion) 
Hig probability C(100,.95) = 78 C( - 100,.95) = - 84 High proba ility (Risk Aversion) (Risk Seeking) 
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Suppose the value of the prospect (x, p) is given by w(p)v(x), where v is the 
value function for gains and losses, and w is a nonlinear weighting function. 
Figure 1 presents a typical weighting function obtained by Tversky and Fox 
(1994). This function exhibits diminishing sensitivity: it is steepest near the 
endpoints and shallower in the middle, yielding overweighting of small probabili- 
ties and underweighting of middle and high probabilities. Thus, people underes- 
timate the impact of an increase in probability from 20% to 25% in comparison 
to an increase from 0% to 5% or from 95% to 100%. Such a weighting function 
gives rise to the fourfold pattern described above, under plausible assumptions 
concerning the value function. 
3. BASIC CONCEPTS 
We first introduce terminology and notation, and then describe the theoreti- 
cal framework used in the paper. We distinguish decision under risk, where the 
probabilities are assumed to be known, and decision under uncertainty, where 
the probabilities associated with the various outcomes are not given in advance. 
1.0 
9 
0.8 
C 0.6 | 6 
C 
Z 0.4 
0.2 
0.0 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 
Probability (p) 
FIGURE 1.-The points represent median estimates, across subjects (N = 40), obtained in Tversky 
and Fox (1994). The smooth curve is obtained by fitting the parametric form w(p) = 8p1/(3pz + 
(1 -p)Y), suggested by Lattimore, Baker, and Witte (1992). The estimated values of the parameters 
are yy= .69, 8= .77. 
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In both cases, the decision maker has to select between prospects that are 
described as positive or negative changes with respect to the status quo. To 
simplify matters, we assume that the outcomes are real numbers designating 
money, and interpret 0 as the status quo. Gains refer to positive outcomes, and 
losses refer to negative outcomes. In decision under risk a prospect is described 
by a finite probability distribution. Thus (x1, Pt1; ... ; Xn, Pn) is the risky prospect 
yielding outcome xj with probability pj, j = 1,..., n; the pj's are nonnegative 
and sum to one. If there is only one nonzero outcome then the zero outcome is 
suppressed; for example, (Z, 1/2) is the prospect that yields Z with probability 
1/2 and 0 with probability 1/2. 
Decision under uncertainty is described in terms of a set S, called the state 
space. We assume that exactly one state obtains, but the decision maker is 
uncertain about this state. Subsets of S are called events; S -A is the comple- 
ment to A. In decision under uncertainty, prospects are functions from S to RO, 
taking finitely many values. If state s obtains, then prospect f yields the 
outcome f(s). An uncertain prospect is described as (x1, A1; .. .; Xn, An), where 
(A1,..., A,) is a partition of S and xi is the outcome associated with the states 
in Ai. As above, the zero outcome is suppressed if there is only one nonzero 
outcome; thus (x, A) is the prospect that yields x if A obtains, and 0 if it does 
not. 
Risk can be considered as a special case of uncertainty where probabilities are 
given for the events in S, and prospects that generate the same probability 
distribution over the outcomes are treated as identical. In this case, each 
prospect is described by the probability distribution it induces over the out- 
comes, with no reference to the state space. 
We identify outcomes with degenerate prospects. Thus x can be viewed as a 
constant function assigning outcome x to all states or as a degenerate probabil- 
ity distribution assigning probability 1 to that outcome. Let a denote the 
preference relation over prospects; the relations >-, are defined as usual. 
Cumulative Prospect Theory 
This article adopts the theoretical framework of cumulative prospect theory, 
or CPT for short (Tversky and Kahneman (1992)). This theory is more general 
than the rank-dependent utility model because it permits a different treatment 
of gains and losses.2 It assumes a continuous strictly increasing value function v: 
1R -* lR satisfying v(O) = 0. For choice under risk, it invokes two weighting 
functions, denoted by w+ and w-, for gains and losses respectively.3 A weighting 
function w is a strictly increasing function from [0,1] to [0,1] with w(O) = 0 and 
w(1) = 1. For uncertainty, the weighting functions for gains and losses are 
denoted by W+ and W-. Here a weighting function (or a capacity) W on S is a 
2 Closely related models were proposed by Starmer and Sugden (1989) and Luce and Fishbum 
(1991). 
3 In following sections the superscript + is often suppressed. 
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function on 2' such that W(0) = 0, W(S) = 1, and W(A) 2 W(B) whenever 
A D B. Obviously, if W is additive, i.e., W(A U B) = W(A) + W(B) for all 
disjoint events A, B, then it is a probability measure. 
According to CPT, the value of a prospect (x1, Pl;...; Xn, PA) in which 
X1 < . Xk < ?O Xk+l < ... <Xn, iS 
k n 
(3.1) E r7T-V(Xj) + E lTj+V(Xj), 
j=l j=k+l 
where the decision weights are defined by T7- = w-(p1 + +pj) - p 
+ --- +pj-1) andwj+ = w+(pj + --- +pn) - w+(pj+1 + --- +pn).4 Note that these 
weights do not necessarily sum to one. For uncertainty, the value of a prospect 
(x1, Al;...; xn, A), in which x1 < .. <xk < 0 <xk+l < ... <xn is 
k n 
(3.2) E 7rj-V(Xj) + E Grj+V(Xj), 
j=1 j=k+l 
where now decision weights are defined by T7 = W-(A1 U ... UA1)- W-(Al 
U .. uAj1) and u-+ = W+(Aj u . UAn) - W+(Aj+1 u * u AnV 
CPT generalizes rank-dependent utility, introduced by Quiggin (1982) and 
Yaari (1987) in the context of risk, and by Schmeidler (1989) in the context of 
uncertainty. Rank-dependent utility corresponds to the special case where the 
weighting function for losses is the dual of the weighting function for gains, i.e., 
w-(p) = 1 - w+(1 -p), and W-(A) = 1 - W+(S -A). For prospects with non- 
negative outcomes, rank-dependent utility coincides with CPT. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992) considered another special case of CPT, where w + = w - or 
W+= W-, which provided a reasonably good fit for risk choice. Preference 
conditions for this property, called reflection, are presented in Appendix B. 
We assume that the weighting function for risk is continuous, and that the 
weighting function for uncertainty satisfies solvability,6 i.e., for all events A c C 
and W(A) ?p < W(C) there exists an event B such that W(B) = p and A cB c 
C. The assumptions made throughout this paper are summarized below; they 
have been axiomatized in Wakker and Tversky (1993, Section 8.4): 
ASSUMPTION 3.1: Risky prospects are probability distributions over R. Uncertain 
prospects are functions from the state space S to the outcome set R. Prospects have 
finitely many outcomes. Preferences between prospects are represented by (3.1) or 
(3.2). The value function is continuous and strictly increasing. The weighting 
fuinction for risk is continuous and strictly increasing; for uncertainty it satisfies 
solvability. 
4Here we follow the usual convention that, for j=0, P + 0+pj=, and for j= n, Pj+i 
5Forj =,A1U uAj=0; forj=n, Aj+1u UAn=0. 
6 Gilboa (1987) introduced this condition under the name convex-ranged. 
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FIGURE 2. Illustration of SA. 
4. SUBADDITIVITY IN CHOICE UNDER RISK 
In this article we focus on the weighting function for gains. The analysis for 
losses is essentially identical and, with few exceptions, will not be discussed 
separately. Thus we restrict attention to nonnegative outcomes, and suppress 
the superscript in w+ and W+. This section discusses risk; uncertainty is 
discussed in following sections. 
The weighting function presented in Figure 1 is S-shaped: It is steepest near 0 
and 1 and shallower in the middle. The experimental evidence is generally 
consistent with such a weighting function (Camerer (1992), Cohen and Jaffray 
(1988), Tversky and Kahneman (1992)). Thus, in Figure 1 a "lower" interval 
[0, q] has more impact than a middle interval [p, p + q] provided the middle 
interval is bounded away from the upper endpoint 1 (e.g., p + q < .9). Similarly, 
an "upper" interval [1 - q, 1] has more impact than a middle interval [p, p + q] 
provided the middle interval is bounded away from the lower endpoint 0 (e.g., 
p ? .1). The following definition formalizes this notion (see Figure 2): w satisfies 
bounded subadditivity, or subadditivity (SA) for short,7 if there exist constants 
e 2 0 and e' ? 0 such that 
(4.1) w(q) 2 w(p + q) - w(p) whenever p + q < 1-e 
and 
(4.2) 1 - w(1 - q) 2 w(p + q) - w(p) whenever p e'. 
Conditions (4.1) and (4.2) are called lower SA and upper SA, respectively. Lower 
SA entails the inequality w(p + q) < w(p) + w(q) on the interval [0,1 -e. 
Upper SA implies the same inequality on the interval [0,1 - e'] for the dual 
weighting function wi(p) = 1 - w(1 -p), as can be seen by substitution. The 
constants e, e' are called boundary constants, and do not depend on p, q. They 
serve to ensure that we always compare an interval that includes 0 or 1 with an 
7For convenience, we use the terms bounded SA or SA instead of the more accurate term 
e,e'-SA. 
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interval that does not. Naturally, they may vary from one individual to the other. 
We are primarily interested in lower SA near 0, say on the interval [0,0.4], and 
in upper SA near 1, say on the interval [0.6,1]. This corresponds to e = e' = .6. 
Since w is fairly linear in the middle region, lower and upper SA usually hold for 
larger intervals, and for most functions found in the literature e = .1 and even 
' = 0 can be chosen. For instance, for the weighting function depicted in 
Figure 1, SA holds for boundary constants e = .07 and e' = 0, and hence for any 
larger boundary constants. 
Preference Conditions 
Next we present conditions for preferences that are necessary and sufficient 
for bounded subadditivity. These conditions are independent of the value 
function, and thus separate what we have called chance attitude from marginal 
utility. Previous work assumed a linear value function (Yaari (1987), Chateauneuf 
(1991)) or a concave value function (Chew, Karni, and Safra (1989), Chew 
(1989)). Furthermore these papers investigated convex, rather than subadditive, 
weighting functions. 
We begin with the certainty effect, which leads to upper SA (4.2). As 
demonstrated by Allais, people commonly exhibit the following preferences, 
where M denotes one million dollar: 
(1M,.11) -< (5M,.10) and 
iM >- (0, .01; 1M, .89; 5M, .10). 
The certainty effect suggests the preference condition that is needed to charac- 
terize upper SA. To illustrate, let us shift probability mass from 5M to 0 in the 
upper right prospect until the decision maker is indifferent between the upper 
prospects. Suppose we find 
(1M,.11) - (5M.,.08). 
Obviously, from the second preference above it follows by dominance that the 
same probability shift (.2 from 5M to 0 on the right) yields 
1M >- (0, .03; 1M, .89; 5M, .08). 
In general, upper SA requires that 
(4.3) (z, 1 - q) - (Z, p) implies 
z a (0, 1 -p - q; z, q; Z, p) 
for 0 < z < Z, and p ? e' where e' > 0 is the boundary constant.8 To interpret 
the condition, recall that in CPT prospects are evaluated in terms of cumulative 
events, e.g., receiving z or more. According to (4.3), an increase of q in the 
probability of that event has more impact on the left, where it makes that event 
certain than on the right where it merely makes the event more probable. It is 
instructive to note that the CPT difference between the left prospects in (4.3) is 
8Segal (1987) proposed a similar generalization of the Allais example which implies a convex 
weighting function. 
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(1 - w(1 - q))v(z), and between the right prospects is (w(p + q) - w(p))v(z); 
hence (4.2) implies (4.3) since v(z) > 0. 
Next we turn to the overweighting of small probabilities. Consider the 
following preferences. 
40 -< (0, .35; 40, .05; 100, .60) 
(40,.95; 100,.05) >- (100,.65). 
Let us shift probability mass from $100 to 0 in the upper right prospect until the 
decision maker is indifferent between the upper prospects. Suppose we find 
40 (0, .45; 40, .05; 100, .50). 
From the second preference above it follows by dominance that the same 
probability shift (.10 from 100 to 0 on the right) yields 
(40,.95; 100,.05) >- (100,.55). 
In general, lower SA requires that 
(4.4) z -(0,1 
-P - q; z, q; Z, p) implies 
(z,l1 - q; Z,q) a, (Z, p + q), 
for 0 < z < Z and p + q < 1 - e, where e 2 0 is the boundary constant. Thus a 
q probability shift from z to Z has more impact on the left, where it makes 
the receipt of (at least) Z possible, than on the right where it merely increases 
the probability of receiving (at least) Z. Note that for the right prospects 
the extreme outcomes, 0 and Z, did not change, whereas for the left prospects 
the best outcome changed from z to Z. To see that lower SA implies (4.4), note 
that the CPT difference between the left prospects in (4.4) is w(q)(v(Z) - v(z)), 
and between the right prospects it is (w(p + q) - w(p)Xv(Z) - v(z)). 
PROPOSITION 4.1: UnderAssumption 3.1, the weighting function w satisfies SA if 
and only if the preference relation satisfies (4.3) and (4.4).9 
Actually, lower SA is equivalent to (4.4), and upper SA to (4.3). 
Applications 
With the exception of convex weighting functions, explored by several authors, 
the parametric weighting functions proposed in the literature are generally 
consistent with bounded subadditivity. Setting 8= .1 and 8' = 0 is sufficient to 
accommodate most of these functions. 
There are two approaches for testing SA, axiomatic and parametric. Wakker, 
Erev, and Weber (1994) found that in its general form the comonotonic 
independence axiom, which underlies all rank-dependent models, did not fare 
better than the independence axiom of expected utility, but "CPT with its 
S-shaped w-function provides the best description of the choice patterns ob- 
9The same boundary constant e applies to (4.1) and (4.4), and the same boundary constant ' to 
(4.2) and (4.3). 
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served in this experiment. However, the improvement in prediction does not 
reach statistical significance" (p. 214). Stronger support for the preference 
conditions for an S-shaped weighting function was obtained by Wu and Gonza- 
les (1994). 
Most studies have estimated decision weights on the basis of various paramet- 
ric assumptions about the value or the weighting function. The resulting weight- 
ing functions generally supported SA (Hogarth and Einhorn (1990), Birnbaum, 
Coffey, Mellers, and Weiss (1992), Lattimore, Baker, and Witte (1992), Tversky 
and Kahneman (1992), Gonzales (1993), Camerer and Ho (1994), Tversky and 
Fox (1994)); for a recent review that includes some earlier literature, see 
Camerer (1994). 
Violations of SA are rare. One of the four subjects in Allais (1988) exhibits a 
convex ("pessimistic") weighting function, which violates lower SA. In Latti- 
more, Baker, and Witte (1992), only five out of 114 subjects yielded estimates 
that were inconsistent with SA. Karmarkar (1978) and Karni and Safra (1990) 
also considered S-shaped weighting functions. 
It is noteworthy that lower SA accounts for the observed tendency (Kahne- 
man and Tversky (1979)) to undervalue probabilistic insurance that reduces the 
probability of a loss, say from p to p72, relative to regular insurance that 
reduces it from p to 0. 
In order to characterize the degree of departure from expected utility theory, 
it is useful to devise a measure of the degree of SA. To this end, define for given 
p, q satisfying p + q < 1 and the appropriate boundary conditions, 
D(p, q) = w(p) + w(q) - w(p + q) and 
D'(p, q) = 1 - w(l - q) + w(p) - w(p + q). 
Under SA, both D and D' are positive for all p, q that satisfy the boundary 
conditions, whereas under expected utility D and D' are both zero. Let d and 
d' denote, respectively, the average values of D over all p + q < 1 - e and of 
D' over all p ?e'. 
Simple graphical interpretations are possible whenever the weighting function 
is approximately linear except near the endpoints; see Figure 3. In this case, for 
all p, q in the linear middle range, D and D' are independent of p and q, and 
D is the lower intercept, D' the upper intercept, of the linear function. Thus the 
averages d and d' provide estimates for the lower and upper intercepts, and 
s = 1 - d - d' is an estimate of the slope; s can be interpreted as an index of 
sensitivity to probability changes. It equals 1 for expected utility, and it is less 
than 1 under SA. If expected utility is accepted as a standard for rational choice, 
then s could be interpreted as an index of rationality. 
Tversky and Fox (1994) estimated the values of d, d', and s for three studies 
of risky choice. The median estimates were .07, .16, and .76, in accord with both 
lower and upper SA. The observation that d' exceeds d suggests that upper SA 
is generally more pronounced than lower SA. Further discussion of the empiri- 
cal evidence appears in the final section. 
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FIGURE 3.-A weighting function that is linear except near the endpoints. 
5. SUBADDITIVITY IN CHOICE UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
The above definitions of SA naturally extend to uncertainty: W satisfies 
bounded subadditivity, or subadditivity (SA) for short,10 if there are events F, E' 
such that 
(5.1) W(B) ? W(A U B) - W(A) whenever W(A U B) ? W(S -E) 
and 
(5.2) 1 - W(S - B) ? W(A U B) - W(A) whenever W(A) ? W(E). 
Conditions (5. 1) and (5.2) are called lower SA and upper SA, respectively. Lower 
SA implies that an event B has a greater impact when added to the null event 
than when it is added to a nonnull event A. Upper SA implies that an event B 
has a greater impact if it is subtracted from certainty than when it is subtracted 
from an event A U B. Upper SA for W is equivalent to lower SA for the dual 
weighting function W(A) = 1 - W(S - A). The events E, E' are called lower 
and upper boundary events. They are "small" events that do not depend on A 
and B. Under SA, an event B has greater impact when it turns impossibility into 
possibility or possibility into certainty than when it merely makes a possibility 
more likely. That is, a change from 0 to B, or from S - B to S, is more 
noticeable than a change from A to A U B. 
Preference Conditions 
The preference conditions for uncertainty are s'imilar to those for risk, but 
require one further preparation; because the probabilities are not given, in- 
equalities such as W(A) ? W(E') must be defined in terms of preferences. This 
is commonly done by defining A natB if there exists a gain Z such that 
10Again, we use the terms bounded SA or SA instead of the more accurate E, E'-SA. 
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TABLE II 
A DEMONSTRATION OF SA. OUTCOMES DEPEND ON THE TEMPERATURE t 
AT 4 PM ON APRIL 1, 1991 IN NEW YORK CITY. THE PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS 
(113 STOCK BROKERS) WHO SELECrED EACH PROSPECT IS GIVEN IN BRACKETS, 
SEPARATELY FOR GAINS (K = $1000) AND FOR LOSSES (K = - $1000). 
Al A2 A3 A4 
Problem if t > 80 if 80 2 t 2 70 if 70 > t > 60 if 60 > t Gains Losses 
I 0 0 0 5K [65] [34] 
g 2K 2K 0 0 [35] [66] 
II 5f " K 0 0 0 [58] [29] 
g" 0 0 2K 2K [42] [71] 
III f 5K 0 0 5K [32] [72] 
g 2K 2K 2K 2K [68] [28] 
(Z, A) a (Z, B), that is, winning on A is preferred to winning on B."1 Clearly, 
A a B if and only if W(A) > W(B). The following two conditions characterize 
SA: 
(5.3) z' (O,S- (A uB);z,B;Z,A) implies 
(z, S -B; Z, B) a, (Z, A U B) 
whenever 0 <z <Z and A UB i S -E, and 
(5.4) (z, S - B) - (Z, A) implies 
z a- (O, S -(A U B); z, B; Z, A), 
whenever 0 <z < Z and A a E'; here E and E' are the boundary events. The 
interpretation of (5.3) and (5.4) is similar to that of the corresponding conditions 
for risk. To see that lower SA implies (5.3), note that the CPT difference 
between the left prospects in (5.3) is W(B)(v(Z) - v(z)), and between the right 
prospects is (W(A U B) - W(A))(v(Z) - v(z)). To derive (5.4) from upper 
SA, note that the CPT difference between the left prospects in (5.4) is (1 - 
W(S - B))v(z), and between the right prospects it is (W(A U B) - W(A))v(z). 
PROPOSITION 5.1: UnderAssumption 3.1, the weightingfunction Wsatisfies SA if 
and only if (5.3) and (5.4) are satisfied.12 
We conclude the section with several empirical observations. Table II illus- 
trates both upper and lower SA, and provides a novel counterexample to 
expected utility that does not involve independence or substitution. 
Table II shows that for the gain prospects the majority choice favored f' over 
g', f" over g", and g over f, although f =f' +f" and g =g' +g". Furthermore, 
11 For losses a dual definition should be used. That is, A is more likely than B if there exists a 
loss -Z such that (-Z, A) < (-Z, B). 
I2The same boundary event E applies to (5.1) and (5.3), and the same boundary event E' applies 
to (5.2) and (5.4). 
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(f', f", g) was the single most popular pattern for gains, exhibited by 31% of the 
subjects. This pattern violates expected utility, but is consistent with SA. To 
verify this, note that lower SA implies W(A1 UA4) < W(A1) + W(A4). Further- 
more, if upper SA exceeds lower SA (i.e., E' = 0 can be taken), as is comm6nly 
the case, then 1 > W(A1 UA2) + W(A3 UA4) follows. Therefore, V(f) < V(f') 
+ V(f") but V(g) > V(g') + V(g" ), where V(f ) denotes the value of prospect f 
according to CPT. Hence the observed pattern is consistent with CPT. Because 
the data exhibit SA in a strict sense, they are inconsistent with expected utility 
theory, in which (setting the utility of 0 to 0) all the above inequalities should be 
equalities. 
Note that the modal preferences for the loss prospects are the mirror image 
of the preferences for the gain prospects, again exhibiting SA in the strict sense 
contrary to expected utility. Here, (g', g", f) was the single most popular 
pattern, exhibited by 35% of the subjects. This pattern is consistent with the 
reflection assumption (W+ = W-), claracterized in Appendix B.13 
Although SA is a plausible condition for decision under uncertainty, it is 
unlikely to hold in some special circumstances in which the union of disjoint 
events is less "vague" than its constituents. For example, consider an urn with 
one hundred green and red balls in unknown proportion, which are numbered 
from 1 to 100. Then the events "even and red" and "even and green" are vague, 
but their union "even" is no longer vague. If, as suggested by Ellsberg (1961), 
people prefer to bet on known probabilities, defined by the numbers, rather than 
on the unknown probabilities involving colors, then SA may not hold in such 
situations. 
6. COMPARATIVE SUBADDITIVITY 
The relation more-concave-than or more-risk-averse-than between utility 
functions of different individuals was introduced and characterized by Pratt 
(1964) and Arrow (1965). This relation orders individuals by their departure 
from the (objective) expected value. In this section we develop a similar analysis 
for weighting functions. Specifically, we introduce and characterize the relation 
of more-SA-than between the weighting functions of different individuals, which 
orders them by their departure from expected utility theory. If this theory is 
taken as the standard of rational behavior, then the more-SA-than relation can 
be interpreted as an ordering by departure from rationality. 
As in Section 4, the present treatment extends previous work (Yaari (1987), 
Chew, Karni, and Safra (1989), Chew (1989), Chateauneuf (1991), Chateauneuf 
and Cohen (1994), Wakker (1994)) by considering S-shaped rather than convex 
weighting functions, and by comparing weighting functions independently of the 
value functions. 
13 The modal choices in Table II are also at variance with additive regret models (Bell (1982), 
Loomes and Sugden (1982), and Fishburn (1982)), which are violated by the strict form of (5.3) and 
(5.4). 
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A transformation 4: [0,11 -] [0,11 is called SA if it has the same mathematical 
properties as an SA weighting function, i.e., 0(0) = 0, 4(1) =-1, 4 is continuous 
and strictly increasing, and 4 satisfies (4.1) and (4.2). One weighting function is 
more SA than another, if the first is obtained from the second by an SA 
transformation. This definition applies to both risk and uncertainty, where the 
weighting functions for uncertainty are defined on the same domain. Figure 4 
illustrates this relation. 
Decision under Risk 
It is readily verified (see Proposition 6.1) that w2 is more SA than w1 if and 
only if the following two conditions hold: 
(6.1) w1(r) = w1(p + q) - w1(p) implies 
w2(r) 2 w2(p + q) - W2(P) 
and 
(6.2) 1 -w1(l -r) = w1(p + q) -w1(p) implies 
1 -w2(1-r) 2 w2(p + q) -w2(p); 
the boundary condition for (6.1) is p + q < 1 - e for e > 0, and the boundary 
1.0 
0.8 
0 0.6 
0)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~P 
0.4 
00 
0.2 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 
Probability (p) 
FIGURE 4.-The weighting function w2 is less additive than wl. 
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condition for (6.2) is p 2 e', where e' ? 0. The proof is based on the observa- 
tion that, under (6.1), W2 satisfies lower SA "when its arguments are measured 
in w1 units." The same logic applies to (6.2). The relation of e and e' to the 
boundary constants for the transformation carrying w1 into w2 is given in 
Appendix A; see (Al) and (A2). According to the above conditions, w2(r) 
and w2(r) = 1 - w2(l - r) are overweighted more than wl(r) and w'1(r) = 1 - 
w1(l - r), respectively. 
Next we present the preference conditions for the proposition that >:2 iS 
more SA than a, defined for the preference orders of two individuals. We 
impose no restrictions on the value functions of the two individuals, so their 
value functions may be different. Two conditions are required, one for upper 
and one for lower SA. First we consider lower SA: 
(6.3) If x 1(O,1-p-q;x,q;X,p) and 
(x,l1- r; X,r) l(X, p +q), then 
Y '22(,1 -p -q;y,q;Y, p) implies 
(y,l1- r; Y,r) '2 (Y, p + q), 
whenever 0 < x < X, O < y < Y, and p + q < 1 - e for the boundary constant 
.? 0. This condition states that if, for >1, the improvement on the left (r 
probability for receiving X instead of x) matches the corresponding improve- 
ment on the right, then for >2 the comparable improvement on the left (r 
probability for receiving Y instead of y) outweighs the corresponding improve- 
ment on the right. To further illustrate the condition, we show how it follows 
from (6.1). The first two indifferences imply, by comparing the CPT difference of 
the left prospects to that of the right prospects, that wl(rXv1(X) - vl(x)) = 
(w1(p + q)-w1(p)Xvj(X) - v1(x)), i.e., w1(r) = w1(p + q) - wl(p). By (6.1), w2(r) 
2 W2(p + q) - w2(p). This implies that w2(rXv2(Y) - v2(y)), i.e., the CPT 
difference between the left prospects in the lower two lines in (6.3), is at least as 
large as (w2(p + q) - w2(p)Xv2(Y) - v2(y)), which is the difference between 
the right two prospects. Hence (6.1) implies (6.3). 
Second, we consider upper SA: 
(6.4) If (x, 1 -r) (X, p) and 
x (0,1 -p-q;x,q;X,p) then 
(y, 1-r) - 2(Y, p) implies 
y > 2(0,1 -p -q;y,q;Y, p), 
whenever 0 < x < X, 0 <y < Y, and p > e' for the boundary constant e' 2 O. 
This condition states that if, for >1, the improvement on the left (yielding x 
with certainty) matches the corresponding improvement on the right, then for 
>2 the comparable improvement on the left (yielding y with certainty) out- 
weighs the corresponding improvement on the right. In other words, the cer- 
tainty effect is more pronounced for the second decision maker than for the 
first. 
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PROPOSITION 6.1: Under Assumption 3.1 (for both >1 and >2)X the following 
three statements are equivalent:14 
(i) w2 is more SA than w1; 
(ii) conditions (6.1) and (6.2) are satisfied; 
(iii) conditions (6.3) and (6.4) are satisfied. 
Decision under Uncertainty 
We first extend (6.1) and (6.2) to uncertainty. W2 is more SA than W1 if and 
only if (see Proposition 6.2) W2 is a strictly increasing transform of Wl, and 
(6.5) W1(C) = W1(A U B) - W1(A) implies 
W2(C) ? W2(A U B) - W2(A) 
and 
(6.6) 1- W1(S - C) = W1(A y B) - WJ1(A) implies 
1- W2(S - C) ? W2(A U B) 
-W2(A) 
The boundary condition for (6.5) is: W1(A U B) < W1(S - E) for some boundary 
event E; the boundary condition for (6.6) is: WJ1(A) ? W(E') for a boundary 
event E'. The relation of E and E' to the boundary constants for the 
transformation carrying W1 into W2 is given in (A3) and (A4) in the Appendix. 
Next we present the corresponding preference conditions for the proposition 
that >2 is more SA than >1 . We require three conditions. 
First, for all events A, B, 
(6.7) A >1 B if and only if A >2 B. 
This condition guarantees that W2 is a strictly increasing transform of W1. The 
second condition ensures that W2 is more lower SA than WJ: 
(6.8) If x-1(O,S-(A UB);x,B;X,A) and 
(x,S-C;X,C) -1(X,A UB) then 
Y '22(0, S - (A U B); y, B; Y, A) implies 
(y, S - C; Y, C) >2 (Y, A U B) 
whenever 0 < x < X, 0 < y < Y, and A U B 
-1 S - E for the boundary event E. 
Third, we require that W2 be more upper SA than WJ: 
(6.9) If (x, S - C) -1 (X, A) and 
x -1(O,S- (A UB);x,B;X,A) then 
(y, S - C) -2 (Y, A) implies 
y >2(0,S-(A UB);y,B;Y,A) 
14 The same boundary constants e, ' apply to conditions (6.1) and (6.2), and to conditions (6.3) 
and (6.4). Their relation to the boundary constants for the transformation carrying w1 into w2 is 
described in (Al) and (A2) in the Appendix. 
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whenever 0 <x <X, 0 <y < Y, and A ,1 E' for the boundary event E'. The 
interpretation of (6.8) and (6.9) is essentially identical to that of (6.3) and (6.4). 
PROPOSITION 6.2: Under Assumption 3.1 (for both >1 and ,2 ), the following 
three statements are equivalent:15 
(i) W2 is more SA than W1; 
(ii) conditions (6.5), (6.6), and (6.7) are satisfied; 
(iii) conditions (6.7), (6.8), and (6.9) are satisfied. 
7. SOURCE DEPENDENCE 
Perhaps the most persistent objection to expected utility theory concerns the 
distinction between risk and uncertainty. The expectation principle, it has been 
argued, can be applied to decision under risk where probabilities are known but 
not to decision under uncertainty or ignorance where the probabilities are 
unknown. This view, advanced by several authors, notably Keynes (1921) and 
Knight (1921), has been underscored by Ellsberg (1961), who argued convinc- 
ingly that people prefer to bet on an urn that contains an equal number of green 
and red balls than on an urn that contains red and green balls in an unknown 
proportion. Numerous experiments have confirmed this hypothesis; see Camerer 
and Weber (1992) for a review. More generally, there is evidence that people's 
preferences depend not only on their degree of uncertainty but also on the 
source of uncertainty. This phenomenon has been called source dependence. 
In this section we distinguish two aspects of source dependence, which we call 
source preference and source sensitivity. Let v and v be two distinct families 
of events. For example, one family may be generated by spinning a roulette 
wheel, the other by the possible outcomes of a horse race. We shall refer to such 
families as sources. We assume that the families are closed under union and 
complementation, and are rich in the sense that they both satisfy solvability. In 
decision under risk, we interpret the uncertainty as generated by a standard 
random device. Although probabilities could be realized by various random 
devices, we do not distinguish between them and treat risk as a single source. 
Source Preference 
In the domain of gains, the decision maker exhibits a general preference for 
source V over source _ if, for any event A in sl and B in _, W+(A) = W(B) 
implies W+(S -A) ? W+(S - B). Expressed in terms of preferences, this means 
that (x, A) (x, B) implies (x, S -A) - (x, S - B) for all x> 0. Ellsberg's ex- 
ample of preference for the known over the unknown urn illustrates this 
relation. 
To extend source preference to negative outcomes, we start with the prefer- 
ence condition. A preference to bet on source v rather than W means that 
15 The same boundary events E, E' apply to conditions (6.5) and (6.6), and to conditions (6.8) and 
(6.9). Their relation to the boundary constants for the transformation carrying W1 into W2 is 
described in (A3) and (A4) in the Appendix. 
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(-x, A) -(-x, B) implies (-x, S-A) a (-x, S-B) for any x > O. In terms of 
the weighting function, therefore, source sl is preferred to source v if W-(A) 
= W-(B) implies W-(S -A) < W(S - B). Note that the inequality for losses is 
the opposite of the inequality for gains. Hence source preference reduces the 
weighting function for losses and enhances the weighting function for gains. 
Indeed, it can be shown that if reflection holds, then source v is preferred to 
source -V for gains if and only if -V is preferred to v for losses. Consequently, 
reflection cannot be satisfied if v is preferred to -V for both gains and losses. 
Source Sensitivity 
We next examine the concept of source sensitivity (SS). In the domain of 
gains, the decision maker exhibits less SS to source -V than to source v' if the 
following two conditions hold: 
(7.1) if W+(A1) = W+(B1) and W+(A2) = W+(BO) 
then W+(A1 UA2) 2 W+(B1 U B2); 
(7.2) if W+(S -A1) = W+(S -B1) and W+(S-A2) = W+(S -B2), 
then W+(S - (A1 UA2)) < W+(S - (B1 U B2)) 
for all disjoint events A1, A2 in v and disjoint events B1, B2 in -V satisfying the 
following boundary conditions. In (7.1), W+(A1 uA2) < W+(S - E) for some 
boundary event E; in (7.2), W+(S - (A1 uA2)) 2 W+(E') for some boundary 
event E'. Conditions (7.1) and (7.2) are dual in the sense that one condition 
holds if and only if the other holds for the dual weighting function. 
To appreciate the above definition, suppose W+ is SA on v and on S. 
Equation (7.1) means that the union of disjoint -V events "loses" more than the 
union of the matching disjoint v events. Hence the decision maker is less 
sensitive to an increase in likelihood in source -V than in source X. Equation 
(7.2) imposes the dual condition. The comparative SS relation between sources 
for the same decision maker is reminiscent of the more-SA-than relation 
between different decision makers for the same source. Both relations reflect 
departure from expected utility, but they are formally and conceptually differ- 
ent. 
Expressed in terms of preferences, (7.1) is equivalent to: 
(7.3) (x, A1) (x, B1) and (x, A2) (x, B2) implies 
(x, A1 UA2) a (x, B1 U B2) for any x > O, 
and (7.2) is equivalent to: 
(7.4) (x,S -A1) (x,S -B1) and (x,S -A2) (x,S -B2) implies 
(x, S - (A1 UA2)) X (x, S - (B1 U B2)) for any x > 0, 
for disjoint A1, A2 and disjoint B1, B2, and under the boundary conditions for 
(7.1) and (7.2), respectively. The relations of source preference and comparative 
SS are logically independent. If people prefer one source to another, they can 
exhibit more or less SS for one source than for the other, or neither. 
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Turning to losses, we say that the decision maker exhibits less SS to source q 
than to source v if conditions (7.1) and (7.2) hold for the weighting function for 
losses. The preference conditions are obtained from (7.3) and (7.4) by inter- 
changing x > O and x < 0, as well as a and i . 
Empirical Evidence 
We conclude this section by discussing some experimental demonstrations of 
SA and source preference. We define, for any disjoint events A, B satisfying the 
appropriate boundary condition, 
D(A,B) = W(A) + W(B)-W(A UB) and 
D'(A,B) = 1- W(S -B) - W(A UB) + W(A). 
Unlike the case of risk, there is no obvious way to define the global measures d 
or d', because there is no natural prior measure on the event space with respect 
to which the averages could be takfn. However, for any given experiment one 
can compute the average of the indices d, d' over all disjoint event pairs A, B. 
Again, s = 1 - d - d' is a measure of correspondence with expected utility. 
Tversky and Fox (1994) estimated decision weights for six sources, including 
risk. The risky events were generated by drawing a ball from an urn with known 
composition. The other sources consisted of the following uncertain quantities: 
the point spread in a playoff basketball game, the point spread of the 1992 
Superbowl, the difference between the closing values of the Dow Jones on 
successive weeks, San Francisco temperature, and Beijing temperature. Table 
III presents the median values of d, d', and s, for all sources of uncertainty in 
each of the three studies. 
All values of d and d' in Table III, which measure lower and upper SA 
respectively, are significantly greater than zero, confirming SA for all sources 
including chance. Furthermore, d and d' are greater (and hence s is smaller) for 
uncertainty than for chance, indicating that people are less sensitive to uncer- 
tainty than to chance. 
Figure 5 displays, for each subject in one study (N = 40), the average s value 
for the two uncertain sources (Super Bowl and Dow Jones) against the s value 
for chance. Three features of Figure 5 are noteworthy. First, all values of s for 
the uncertain sources, and all but two values of s for the risky source are less 
TABLE III 
MEDIAN VALUES OF d AND d', AND S, ACROSS SUBJECTS, MEASURING THE DEGREE 
OF LOWER SA, UPPER SA, AND GLOBAL SENSITIVITY RESPECTIVELY. 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
Source d d ' s d d' s d d' s 
Chance .06 .10 .81 .05 .19 .75 .11 .14 .72 
Basketball .21 .19 .61 
Super Bowl .15 .23 .57 
Dow Jones .12 .22 .67 
S.F. temp. .20 .26 .51 .27 .23 .50 
Beijing temp. .28 .32 .42 
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FIGURE 5.-Joint distribution for all subjects in study 2 of the sensitivity measure s for risk and 
uncertainty. 
than 1, as implied by SA. Second, the sensitivity measure s is significantly 
smaller for uncertainty (mean= .61) than for risk (mean= .75); 32 out of 40 
points lie below the identity line. Third, there is a significant correlation 
(r = .53) between the sensitivity measure for risk and for uncertainty, suggesting 
that the degree of SA (as measured by s) is an important attribute that 
distinguishes among decision makers. 
In addition to the indirect comparisons in terms of s described above, Tversky 
and Fox also tested the preference conditions for comparative SS. The ordinal 
analysis confirmed the previous conclusion: subjects exhibited less SS for all five 
uncertain sources than for chance in the sense that (7.3) and (7.4) were satisfied 
significantly more often in the predicted than in the opposite direction. 
Finally, the evidence indicated that some sources were preferred to risk. For 
example, Stanford students (who lived near San Francisco) preferred to bet on 
San Francisco temperature than on risk, but they preferred to bet on risk than 
on Beijing temperature. 
In summary, it appears that the characteristics of the weighting function, 
which have been observed in studies of risk, tend to hold for uncertainty as well. 
Hence SA emerges as an important descriptive principle for decision under both 
risk and uncertainty. Furthermore, the finding that people are less sensitive to 
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uncertainty than to risk indicates that uncertainty enhances the departures from 
expected utility. Studies of choice under risk therefore provide a lower bound 
for the departure from expected utility caused by nonadditive weights. Finally, 
the observation that people often prefer to bet on unknown rather than known 
probabilities calls for a reassessment of the conclusion commonly drawn from 
Ellsberg's example. It appears that people prefer risk to uncertainty when they 
are made to feel ignorant or incompetent. However, in other situations people 
often prefer betting on an uncertain source (e.g., sports or weather) than on risk 
(Heath and Tversky (1991)). A comprehensive analysis of the causes and 
consequences of source dependence awaits further theoretical and experimental 
research. 
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.1: That the preference conditions are implied by the corresponding 
properties for weighting functions, was already explained in the text. Next we assume that (4.4) holds 
and derive (4.1). Let p, q be such that p + q < 1 - e. 
Case 1: p = 0. Then (4.1) is trivially satisfied. 
Case 2: p > 0 and p + q < 1. Then, by continuity of v, outcomes Z > z > 0 can always be found to 
give the antecedent in (4.4). For any such outcomes, the CPT difference between the left prospects 
in (4.4) is w(q)(v(Z) - v(z)), the CPT difference between the right prospects is (w(p + q) - 
w(p))(v(Z) - v(z)). By positivity of v(Z) - v(z), the consequent preference in (4.4) holds iff 
w(q) ? w(p + q) - w(p). Thus (4.1) follows. 
Case 3: p > 0, p + q = 1. (Note that p + q = 1 can only occur if e = 0.) Define pj =p - 1/j for j 
so large that pj > 0. By Case 2, w(q) 2 w(pj + q) - w(pj) for all such pi; obviously, pj + q < 1 - e. 
By continuity of w, (4.1) follows for p. 
Before turning to the implication (4.3) =* (4.2), let us briefly comment on the duality between (4.3) 
and (4.4). It can be seen that (4.4), when formulated in a perfectly dual manner, would lead to the 
preference condition z (0,1 -p - q; z, q; Z, p) (z, 1 - q) < (Z, p) (under appropriate boundary 
condition). This condition could have been used instead of (4.3) to characterize upper SA of w. We 
think, however, that the slightly different condition in (4.3) (logically equivalent under Assumption 
3.1) is more transparent. Therefore the proof below is not a complete dual to the proof of the 
implication (4.4) (4.1). 
Let us now assume that (4.3) holds and derive (4.2). Let p, q be such that p 2 '. 
Case 1: p = 1 - q. Then (4.2) is trivially satisfied. 
Case 2: 0 <p < 1 - q. Here outcomes Z > z > 0 can always be found to give the antecedent in 
(4.3). For any such outcomes, the CPT difference between the left prospects in (4.3) is (1 - w(1 - 
q))v(z), the CPT difference between the right prospects is (w(p + q) - w(p))v(z). By positivity of 
v(z), the consequent preference in (4.3) holds iff 1 - w(1 - q) 2 w(p + q) - w(p); (4.2) follows. 
Case 3: 0 =p < 1 - q. (Note that p = 0 can only occur if e' = 0.) Define pj = l/j for j so large 
that pj < 1 - q. By Case 2, 1 - w(1 - q) 2 w(pj + q) - w(pj) for all such pj. By continuity of w, (4.2) 
follows for p = 0. Q.E.D. 
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.1: That the preference conditions are implied by the corresponding 
properties for weighting functions, was already explained in the text. Next we assume that (5.3) holds 
and derive (5.1). Suppose that W(A U B) < W(S - E), i.e., A U B X S - E. We may assume that 
A, B are disjoint (the general case follows by substituting A - B for A). 
Case 1: W(A) > 0 and W(A U B) < 1. Then outcomes Z > z > 0 can always be found to give the 
antecedent in (5.3). For any such outcomes, the CPT difference betwen the left prospects in (5.3) is 
W(B)(v(Z) - v(z)), the CPT difference between the right prospects is (W(A U B) - W(A)Xv(Z) - 
v(z)). By positivity of v(Z) - v(z), the consequent preference in (5.3) holds iff W(B) 2 W(A U B) - 
W(A). (5.1) follows. 
Case 2: W(A) = 0 and W(A U B) = 1. (Note that W(A U B) = 1 can only occur if W(S - E) = 1.) 
In this case the antecedent in (5.3) trivially holds, and the consequent preference in (5.3) implies 
W(B) = 1. This implies (5.1). 
Case 3: W(A) = 0 and W(A U B) < 1. This case is derived from Case 1 by a limiting argument 
and solvability of W. If W(A U B) = 0 then (5.1) is immediate; therefore we assume W(A U B) > 0. 
By solvability there exist, for all n sufficiently large, events An such that A cAn cA U B and 
W(An) = 1/n; define Bn =B -An. By Case 1, W(Bn) ? W(An UBn) - W(An); note here that the 
boundary condition is satisfied for An U Bn( =A U B). Since W(B) 2 W(Bn), it follows that W(B) 2 
W(A uB) - W(An). In the limit (5.1) follows. 
Case 4: W(A) > 0 and W(A U B) = 1. If W(A) = 1 then (5.1) trivially holds; assume therefore 
W(A) < 1. By solvability, for all n sufficiently large there exist Bn c B such that W(A) < W(A U Bn) 
= 1 - l/n. By Case 1, W(Bn) 2 W(A U Bn) - W(A); note that the boundary condition is satisfied 
for A U Bn. Because W(B) 2 W(Bn), W(B) 2 W(A UBn) - W(A). In the limit, W(B) 2 W(A UB) 
- W(A) follows, i.e., (5.1) holds. 
Finally, we assume that (5.4) holds and derive (5.2). Suppose that W(A) 2 W(E'), i.e., A a E'. We 
may assume that A, B are disjoint (the general case follows by substituting B -A for B). Note for 
the cases below that, by monotonicity of weighting functions, always W(S - B) 2 W(A). 
Case 1: W(S - B) = W(A). Then (5.2) trivially holds. 
Case 2: W(S - B) > W(A) > 0. Then outcomes Z > z > 0 can always be found to give the 
antecedent in (5.4). For any such outcomes, the CPT difference between the left prospects in (5.4) is 
(1 - W(S - B))v(z); the CPT difference between the right prospects is (W(A U B) - W(A))v(z). By 
positivity of v(z), the consequent preference in (5.4) holds iff 1 - W(S - B)) 2 W(A U B) - W(A). 
(5.2) follows. 
Case 3: W(S - B) > W(A) = 0. (Note that W(A) = 0 can only occur if W(E') = 0.) By solvability 
there exist, for all n sufficiently large, events An such that A cAn c S - B and W(An) = 1/n. Note 
that W(An) 2 W(E') = 0. By Case 2, 1 - W(S - B) 2 W(An U B) - W(An). Because A cAn, 1 - 
W(S - B) 2 W(A U B) - W(An). In the limit 1 - W(S - B) 2 W(A U B) - W(A) follows, i.e., (5.2) 
holds. Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6.1: We show how this result can be derived from the similar result for 
uncertainty, i.e, Proposition 6.2 (the proof of which is given below). Our proof thus illustrates the 
close relation between risk and uncertainty, and does not take much space. The disadvantage is, of 
course, that this proof of Proposition 6.1 is not self-contained but relies on Proposition 6.2. 
Proposition 6.1 follows from Proposition 6.2 by setting S = [0,1], P is the Lebesgue measure, 
W1 = w, o P, and W2 = W2 o P. The only aspect that needs further discussion concerns the boundary 
constants. It was pointed out in the text that w2 being more SA than w1 can be viewed as w2 
satisfying SA "when its arguments are measured in w1 units." Similarly, the boundary constraints for 
the SA transformation p such that w2 = o w1 are simply the original boundary constraints, 
"measured in w1 units." For an elaboration, denote by T the boundary constant for condition (4.1), 
and by ' the one for (4.2), for transformation b. Then p 2 e', the boundary condition for (6.2) and 
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(6.4), corresponds with wl(p) 2 wl(e 'X = W1(E')) ("the values of w1 serve as arguments of 4"), and 
we get: 
(Al) '=w1(e'). 
The boundary constraint for (6.1) and (6.3), i.e., p + q < 1 - X, corresponds to w1(p + q) < w1(1 - c) 
(= W1(S - E)); therefore 
(A2) 1 -e7 = w1(l - ). Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6.2: In this proof we use the notation Vr(B, A) for W(A U B) -W(A), 
where it is implicitly assumed that A and B are disjoint; iv1(B, A) and ir2(B, A) are similar. 
Condition (6.7) is equivalent to W2 = 4 o W1 for a strictly increasing transformation 4, so that will be 
assumed from now on, and (6.7) is no more discussed. Note also that, because of solvability of both 
W1 and W2, the transformation 4 is surjective, hence it must be continuous. Conditions (6.5) and 
(6.6) can be restricted to disjoint A, B, by replacing B by B -A; this will be assumed below without 
further mention. 
To derive equivalence of (i) and (ii) in the proposition, we first show that condition (6.5) is 
equivalent to condition (4.1) for the transformation 4-the other conditions for 4, 4(O) = 0, 
4(1) = 1, and continuity and strict increa?ingness, have already been established. Condition (4.1) 
means that +(b) 2 4(a + b) - +(a) ("the value of the difference is at least as large as the difference 
of values") whenever a + b < 1 - T; here T denotes the boundary constant for 4, and is related to 
the boundary event E in (6.5) by the equation 
(A3) 1 -e7 = W,(S -E), 
as we shall see. 
The proof is by substituting, along with (A3), a + b = W1(A U B) (for A n B = 0), a = WJ(A), 
b = W1(C); by continuity of 4 and solvability of W1, these substitutions can always be realized. The 
equality W1(C) = vr1(B, A) corresponds with b = a + b - a, the inequality W1(A U B) < W1(S - E) 
corresponds with a + b < 1 - , and W2(C) ? VO2(B, A) corresponds with +(b) 2 4(a + b) - +(a). 
These substitutions show that (4.1) for 4 is equivalent to (6.5) for W1, W2. It is demonstrated in a 
dual manner that (6.6) for W1, W2 is equivalent to (4.2) for 4 (now W1(S - C) = 1 - b). The relation 
between the boundary event E' and the boundary constant ' for the upper SA transformation 4 
iS16 is:6 
(A4) T' = W,(E'). 
Thus the equivalence (i) - (ii) has been established. 
Next we turn to the equivalence (ii) - (iii). First we derive equivalence of (6.5) and (6.8). That 
(6.5) implies (6.8) follows from substitution of CPT. So we assume (6.8) and derive (6.5). Suppose 
W1(A U B) < W1(S-E) and 
W1(C) = v7l(B, A). 
We show that W2(C) ? VO2(B, A). 
Case 1: W1(A U B) < 1. Because W1 and W2 order events the same way, W1(F U G) = W1(G) if 
and only if W2(F U G) = W2(G), so a decision weight iil(F, G) = 0 if and only if Vr2(F, G) = 0. This 
holds in particular for G = 0, i.e., W1(F) = 0 if and only if W2(F) = 0. Hence, in view of the 
assumed W1(C) = irl(B, A), either all of W1(C), irl(B, A), W2(C), Vr2(B, A) are 0, or none. If they 
are all 0, then W2(C) = Vr2(B, A) and we are done. So assume, from now on: 
W1(C), irl(B, A), W2(C), Vr2(B, A) are all positive. 
If W1(A) = 0 then also W2(A) = 0, further by (6.5) then W1(C) = W1(A U B) which implies W2(C) = 
W2(A U B); from these equalities the consequent inequality in (6.5) follows as an equality. Therefore 
assume also that 
W1(A) > O. 
16 For this compatibility of boundary constraints it is essential that the boundary constants e and 
e'for upper and lower SA can be different, and that similarly the boundary events E and E' can be 
different. 
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Since also W1(A u B) < 1, 0 <x <X can be found such that 
x - (O, S- (A u B); x, B; X, A). 
Then also 
(x, S - C; X, C) 1 (X, A U B) 
by the antecedent equality in (6.5), because the CPT difference between the left prospects is the 
same as between the right, i.e., 
W1(C)(v1(X) - vl(x)) = (W1(A uB) - W1(A))(v,(X) - vj(x)). 
Now W2(A) > 0 and W2(A u B) < W2(S) = 1 follow from the corresponding inequalities for W,; 
therefore O < y < Y can be found such that 
Y '22(0,S - (A UB); y,B;Y, A). 
Condition (6.8) implies 
(y, S - C; Y, C) >2 (Y, A u B). 
Comparing the CPT difference of the left prospects to that of the right prospects, we get 
W2(CXV2(Y) - V2(y)) 2 (W2(A U B) - W2(A)Xv2(Y) - v2(y)), i.e., W2(C) 2 W2(A U B) - W2(A); 
(6.5) has been demonstrated. 
Case 2: W1(A U B) = 1. If also W1(A) = 1, then W2(A u B) = W2(S) = 1 = W2(A) follows, imply- 
ing (6.5). Hence assume W1(A) < 1. By solvability we can find, for n sufficiently large, events Bn 
such that Bn cB and W1(A UBn) = 1 - 1/n > W1(A), and (recall that W1(C) = W1(A uB) - W(A) 
> 0) events Cn c C such that Wl(Cn) = WX(C) - 1/n. Then W1(Cn) = W1(A U Bn) - W1(A). By Case 
1, W2(Cn) 2 W2(A U Bn) - W2(A). By continuity of 4, W2(Cn) tends to W2(C), and W2(A U Bn) 
tends to W2(A U B), hence the inequality W2(C) W2(A U B) - W2(A) follows: (6.5) has been 
proved. 
Next we turn to the equivalence (6.6) -* (6.9). That (6.6) implies (6.9) follows from substitution of 
CPT. So we assume (6.9) and derive (6.6). Suppose W1(A) 2 W1(E') and 
7T(C, S- C) = 7T,(B, A). 
We show that i7T2(C, S - C) 2 VO2(B, A). 
Case 1: W1(A) > 0. Because W1 and W2 order events the same way, and 71T(C, S - C) = Vj-(B, A), 
either all of ir1(C, S - C), irl(B, A), iV2(C, S - C), VO2(B, A) are 0, or none. If they are all 0, then 
Vr2(C, S - C) = VO2(B, A) and we are done. So suppose, from now on: 
,7T(C, S - C), -nT1(B, A), T2(C, S -C), i7T2(B, A) are all positive. 
By monotonicity of capacities, W1(S - C) 2 W1(A). Now, by the antecedent equality in (6.6), 
W1(S - C) = W1(A) if and only if W1(A U B) = 1 = W1(S); because W1 and W2 order events the 
same way, similar equalities then hold for W2, which implies the consequent inequality in (6.6). 
Therefore we assume that 
W1(S-C) > W1(A). 
Since also W1(A) > 0, 0 <x <X can be found such that 
(x, S- C) -1 (X, A). 
Then also 
x - (0, S - (A U B); x, B; X, A), 
by the antecedent equality in (6.6), because the CPT difference between the left prospects is the 
same as between the right, i.e., 
[1 - W1(S - C)]v1(x) = [W1(A UB) - W1(A)]vl(x). 
The inequalities W2(S - C) > W2(A) > 0 follow from the corresponding inequalities for W1; there- 
fore 0 <y < Y can be found such that 
(y, S - C) -2(Y, A). 
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Now (6.9) implies 
y >2(0,S- (A UB);y,B;Y,A). 
This and the '2 indifference imply, by taking CPT differences between left and right prospects and 
dividing by v2(y), that 1 - W2(S - C) 2 W2(A u B) - W2(A). (6.6) has been demonstrated. 
Case 2: W1(A) = 0. If W1(A U B) = 0, then W2(A U B) = 0, and (6.6) follows. Suppose therefore 
that W1(A u B) > 0. By solvability we can find, for n sufficiently large, A,, such that A cA, cA u B 
and W1(A,,) = 1/n, and next (noting that 1 - W1(S - C) = W1(A u B) - W1(A) > 0, hence W1(S - 
C) < 1) we can find C,, c C such that W1(S - C,,) = W1(S - C) + 1/n. Setting B,, = (A U B) -A, 
we get 1- W1(S-C,,) = W1(A,, u B,,)-W1(A,,). By Case 1, 1- W2(S-C,,) W2(A,, U B,)- 
W2(A,,) follows, i.e., 1 - W2(S - C,,) 2 W2(A u B) - W2(A,). This inequality implies, by continuity 
of 4, 1 - W2(S - C) 2 W2(A u B) - W2(A), and (6.6) has been established. Q.E.D. 
APPENDIX B: REFLEcTION 
This section presents preference conditions for reflection under risk, i.e., w+ = w-. 
PROPOSITION Bi: Reflection is satisfied if and only if a satisfies the following condition: 
(B1) Ifx -(0,1 -p-q;x,q;X, p) and 
(x, 1 -r; X, r) (X, p + q), then 
-y (-Y, p; -y, q; 0, 1 -p-q) implies 
(-Y,r; -y,1-r)=(-Y,p+q), 
forall -Y< -y<O<x<X, andp,q,re]0,1[. 
PROOF: First we demonstrate necessity of (Bi). The first two indifferences in (Bi) imply that 
w+(r)(v(X)-v(x)) = (w+(p + q)-w+((p))(v(X)-v(x)), i.e., w+(r) = w+(p + q)-w+(p). By 
reflection then w-(r) = w-(p + q) - w-(p). This implies w-(r)(v(-y) - v(-Y)) = (w-(p + q) - 
w-(p)Xv(-y)-v(-Y)); the left-hand side is the CPT difference between the lower pair of 
prospects left of -, the right-hand side is the CPT difference between the lower pair of right 
prospects. Therefore the third indifference in (Bi) implies the fourth. We conclude that reflection 
implies (Bi). 
Next we assume that (Bi) holds, and derive reflection. Take P,...,p,, such that w+(p ) =j/n 
for all j. Then take, for all 2 < j < n - 1, Xi > xi > 0 such that 
Xi (0, 1 -pj; Xi, Pj -Pj- 1; Xi, Pi- 1)- 
The following indifference is obtained by substitution of CPT, where the CPT value of both 
prospects is increased by (v(Xj) - v(xi))In: 
(xi, 1 -Pi; Xi,p1) (Xi,pj). 
Next take, for all 2 < j < n -1, -Y < -yi < 0 such that 
-Yi (- Yi,Pi- 1; -Yi, pi-Pj- 1;O, 1 -pi). 
It follows from the above three indifferences and (B1) that 
(-Yi, pi; -yi, 1 -pi) (- Yi, pi) . 
The two loss-indifferences, and CPT, imply that w-(pl) = w-(pj) - w-(pj 1). As this holds for all 
2 <j < n - 1, w-(p) - w-(pj- 1) = w-(p1) for all such j. So, for a positive constant A, w- = Aw+ 
on {Pi. - Pn-}, which set is the inverse under w+ of {1/n,...,1- 1/n}. It follows that A is 
independent of n (for k # m, compare to i = k -m). As n tends to infinity it follows, firstly, that Pn - 
tends to 1, next, that A must be 1, then, finally, that the continuous strictly increasing functions w + 
and w- must be identical. This establishes reflection. Q.E.D. 
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Because the weighting function is S-shaped, it is similar to its dual; hence the qualitative 
predictions of CPT and rank-dependent utility are not very different. The key difference is that 
reflection implies w+(1/2) < 1/2 w-(1/2) < 1/2, whereas rank-dependent utility implies 
w+(1/2) < 1/2 w-(1/2) > 1/2. In the study of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), the estimated 
weighting functions for all 25 subjects satisfied the inequalities w+(1/2) < 1/2 and w-(1/2) < 1/2, 
in accord with CPT. 
Much less is known about the relation between the weighting functions for gains and losses in the 
context of uncertainty. We suspect that the close correspondence observed in the domain of risk may 
not always hold for uncertainty. 
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